Washington Worries the Israelis Will Bomb Iran’s Nuclear Sites. But Can They?
For 22 years, Israeli forces have prepared for this moment. However, it seems unlikely they will target Iran's nuclear facilities in the upcoming retaliatory strikes, or that they could succeed without U.S. assistance.
An Israeli F-15 flying over southern Israel in March. The country is capable of striking targets deep inside Iran but would prefer to have the support of the United States.Two years ago, dozens of Israeli fighter jets thundered over the Mediterranean, simulating a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Israeli defense forces openly framed the exercise as practice for “long-range flight, aerial refueling, and striking distant targets.”
The drill wasn’t merely aimed at intimidating Iran. It also sent a message to the Biden administration: Israel was preparing to execute the mission alone, though the chances of success would be far higher if the U.S., with its 30,000-pound “bunker busters,” joined the effort.
In interviews, current and former senior Israeli officials expressed doubts about whether Israel could inflict significant damage on Iran’s nuclear sites. Yet in recent days, Pentagon officials have quietly speculated whether Israel is considering acting alone, believing this may be a rare, fleeting opportunity.
President Biden has cautioned against targeting nuclear or energy sites, urging that any response be “proportionate” to last week’s Iranian attack on Israel, effectively conceding that some retaliation is justified. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has conveyed to his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Gallant, that the U.S. wants Israel to avoid actions that could trigger further escalation by Iran. Gallant is scheduled to meet with Austin in Washington on Wednesday.
Israel’s initial retaliation for Tuesday’s missile strikes is likely to target military bases, and possibly intelligence or leadership sites, according to officials. At least for now, it seems Israel will refrain from hitting Iran's nuclear facilities, which, after significant debate, appear to be reserved for a later phase—should Iran respond with further escalation.
However, there is growing pressure within Israel, and echoed by some in the U.S., to seize this moment to cripple Iran’s nuclear capabilities. American intelligence officials and independent experts increasingly warn that Iran is on the verge of producing a bomb. While public discourse often highlights Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels within weeks, the more critical issue is that it could take Iranian engineers months, or even over a year, to turn that material into a deliverable weapon.
Naftali Bennett, a hardline nationalist and former prime minister who has positioned himself politically to the right of Benjamin Netanyahu, recently emphasized this urgency. “Israel now has its greatest opportunity in 50 years to reshape the Middle East,” he wrote on social media. “We must act *now* to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, its key energy infrastructure, and fatally cripple this terrorist regime.”
He added, “We have the justification. We have the tools. Now that Hezbollah and Hamas are paralyzed, Iran stands exposed.”
Meanwhile, American officials, led by President Biden, have launched a concerted effort to prevent such strikes, arguing they would likely be ineffective and risk plunging the region into a full-scale war.
The debate over how to confront Iran has emerged as a campaign issue. Former President Donald J. Trump has advocated for striking Iran’s nuclear sites first and “worrying about the rest later,” despite avoiding such actions during his presidency. On Sunday, Representative Michael R. Turner, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, criticized President Biden on CBS’s *Face the Nation*, calling it “completely irresponsible” for Biden to now rule out military strikes, after previously suggesting they were still a possibility.
The sudden debate over a potential strike has raised new concerns. How much could Israel realistically delay Iran’s nuclear progress? Or would such an attack merely push Iran’s nuclear program further underground, prompting it to expel the remaining nuclear inspectors who still have limited access to key facilities? Moreover, what if an Israeli strike provokes Iran’s leadership to finally pursue a nuclear weapon— a threshold they have refrained from crossing for nearly 25 years?
At Natanz, an Old Target and a New One
The Natanz nuclear enrichment plant has captured Israel’s attention for 22 years. Credit...Planet Labs
For 22 years, Israel and Washington have focused their attention on Iran's Natanz nuclear enrichment plant, buried deep beneath the desert.
Israel has developed plans to destroy or cripple the vast centrifuge hall at Natanz, where thousands of towering, silver machines spin at supersonic speeds to enrich uranium toward bomb-grade levels. Although Tehran officially denies seeking a nuclear weapon, in recent months, Iranian officials and commentators have openly debated whether Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's 2003 fatwa, which prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons, should be overturned.
Meanwhile, Iran has ramped up production of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, just below bomb-grade. Experts believe Iran now has enough material for three or four bombs, and reaching 90 percent, the level required for a weapon would take only days.
While Natanz would be a relatively easy target, striking it would amount to an act of war. For the past 15 years, the U.S. has promoted diplomacy, sabotage, and sanctions—rather than airstrikes—to disrupt Iran's nuclear program. It has also actively prevented Israel from obtaining the necessary weapons to destroy Fordow, another centrifuge facility buried deep inside a mountain.
President George W. Bush refused Israel’s request for America’s largest bunker-busting bombs and the B-2 bombers required to deliver them—essential tools for any strike on Fordow or other heavily fortified sites. Bush’s decision sparked a debate within the White House: Vice President Dick Cheney supported a military strike, but Bush resisted, arguing that the U.S. couldn’t afford another war in the Middle East. Ehud Barak, a former Israeli prime minister and top military officer, later recalled in a 2019 interview with *The Times* that Bush’s warning “did not really make any difference for us.” As of late 2008, Barak said, Israel lacked a viable plan for attacking Iran.
Israel quickly devised several strategies. The debate over the bunker busters led to the creation of a major covert operation known as the “Olympic Games,” a highly classified Israeli-American initiative aimed at destroying Iran’s centrifuges using cyberweapons. The Stuxnet virus, a product of this collaboration, successfully destroyed more than 1,000 centrifuges, delaying Iran’s program by a year or more.
However, the Olympic Games was not a panacea: Iran rebuilt and added thousands more centrifuges, relocating much of its effort deeper underground. Furthermore, the public revelation of the malicious code spurred other countries to develop their own capabilities for infrastructure attacks, targeting electric grids and water systems.
In addition to cyber warfare, Israel carried out targeted assassinations of scientists, struck above-ground enrichment facilities, attacked centrifuge-manufacturing centers with drones, and invested significant resources in preparing for a possible assault on these facilities.
Israeli efforts faced setbacks after the Obama administration reached a nuclear deal with Iran, leading the latter to ship much of its nuclear fuel out of the country. Later, when President Trump withdrew from the agreement, he and Prime Minister Netanyahu believed that threats from Washington would compel Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Consequently, the Israel Defense Forces shifted their focus to Hezbollah and the underground tunnels where the group stored Iranian-produced missiles.
When Mr. Bennett became prime minister in 2021, Israeli officials reported that he was taken aback by the country’s lack of preparedness to strike Iran’s nuclear program. In response, he ordered new exercises simulating long-distance flights to Iran and allocated additional resources for these preparations. Even today, however, Israel's capabilities remain limited. The country relies on an aging fleet of Boeing 707 aerial refueling planes, and it will take years for the United States to deliver newer models that can support longer-range missions.
Israel's bunker busters have proven effective against the tunnels where Hezbollah stores missiles, which allowed Israeli forces to eliminate Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, last month. While Israeli officials believe they can neutralize the air defenses surrounding many nuclear sites—having targeted one in a missile exchange with Iran in April—penetrating highly fortified nuclear facilities embedded in mountains remains a significant challenge.
“The nuclear target is very difficult to hit,” said Gen. Frank McKenzie, who oversaw Iran war plans while leading United States Central Command. “There are many other alternatives to that target,” he noted, adding that options like attacking energy infrastructure would be much easier to execute.
Iran’s Next Moves
Regardless of whether Israel decides to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, new concerns about Iran’s nuclear future have emerged.
The first concern, frequently raised by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in recent weeks, is that Russia may be sharing nuclear technology with Iran. Based on intelligence that the U.S. has chosen not to disclose, officials describe this assistance as “technical” and emphasize that there is no evidence indicating that Russia is providing Iran with the hardware necessary to develop a nuclear warhead.
Before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia had cooperated with the U.S. and Europe in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, even participating in the 2015 negotiations alongside Western nations. However, if American reports are accurate, Russia's need for Iranian drones and other weaponry could accelerate Iran’s progress toward acquiring a nuclear device.
The second concern is that the recent damage inflicted on Hezbollah, including the decapitation of its leadership, may leave Iran feeling vulnerable. With Hezbollah’s ability to strike Israel compromised, Iran might view acquiring a nuclear weapon as its only viable deterrent against Israeli aggression.
The third concern is that targeting Iran's nuclear program will become increasingly difficult. Several years ago, under the surveillance of American and Israeli satellites, Iran began constructing an extensive tunnel network just south of Natanz, believed by the U.S. to be intended for a new enrichment center—the largest in Iran. This facility is not yet operational. Historically, Israel has chosen to launch preemptive strikes at moments when reactors were still under construction, as it did in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.
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